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Steering the Climate System: 
Using Inertia to Lower the Cost of Policy†
By Derek Lemoine and Ivan Rudik*
Common views hold that the efficient way to limit warming to a 
chosen level is to price carbon emissions at a rate that increases 
exponentially. We show that this Hotelling tax on carbon emissions 
is actually inefficient. The least-cost policy path takes advantage of 
the climate system’s inertia to delay reducing emissions and allow 
greater cumulative emissions. The efficient carbon tax follows an 
inverse-U-shaped path and grows more slowly than the Hotelling 
tax. Economic models that assume exponentially increasing carbon 
taxes are overestimating the cost of limiting warming, overestimat-
ing the efficient near-term carbon tax, and overvaluing technologies 
that mature sooner. (JEL H23, Q54, Q58)
In recent years, several international agreements have committed nations to 
limiting global warming to 2 degrees Celsius (Jaeger and Jaeger 2010; Gillis 
2014). The 2015 Paris Agreement even encourages nations to limit warming to 
1.5 degrees Celsius. These temperature limits require substantial, costly reduc-
tions in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions over the next century. Surprisingly, econ-
omists have yet to theoretically analyze the emission trajectory that efficiently 
limits warming to a chosen level. We demonstrate that the efficient policy tra-
jectory postpones emission reductions to take advantage of the climate system’s 
considerable inertia.
If the goal were to limit the accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere, then the 
least-cost policy would price emissions at a level that increases at the rate of interest 
plus the rate at which CO2 decays in the atmosphere (Nordhaus 1980, 1982; Peck 
and Wan 1996; Goulder and Mathai 2000). This least-cost trajectory is commonly 
called a Hotelling trajectory: if we consider the atmosphere’s  CO2-holding capacity 
as an exhaustible resource whose quantity is fixed by the chosen CO2 limit, then 
the least-cost policy depletes the resource (via emissions) according to the analysis 
of Hotelling (1931). The intuition is as follows. Along a least-cost trajectory, the 
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 policymaker must be indifferent to small deviations in the trajectory. Imagine that 
the policymaker considers deviating by allowing an additional unit of emissions 
today. Instead of spending money on reducing emissions today, the policymaker 
would invest those savings and compensate by undertaking additional emission 
reductions  t years in the future. In order to return to the original CO2 trajectory, 
the policymaker will not need to reduce future emissions by a full unit because the 
additional unit of emissions will have decayed at rate  δ . By deviating in this fashion, 
the policymaker has earned interest at rate  r over those  t years and has also seen the 
required spending decline at the rate  δ of CO2 decay. In order for the policymaker 
to be indifferent to this deviation, the marginal cost of emission reductions (i.e., the 
tax on CO2 emissions) must grow at rate  r + δ .
We show that the marginal cost of emission reductions should follow a qualita-
tively different trajectory when policymakers aim to limit total warming rather than 
total CO2. The reason is that an increase in CO2 neither immediately nor fully trans-
lates into an increase in warming. The climate system displays substantial inertia, 
warming only slowly in response to additional CO2.
1 A year’s temperature is deter-
mined not just by the contemporary quantity of CO2 in the atmosphere but also by 
the past trajectory of CO2. Additional warming incurred by temporarily raising CO2 
cannot be undone simply by returning to the original CO2 trajectory. By allowing 
additional warming over the next  t years, a policymaker sacrifices some of the brak-
ing services provided by the inertia in the climate system. In order to return to the 
original temperature trajectory, the policymaker must undertake a sufficiently large 
quantity of emission reductions to bring time  t CO2 some distance below its original 
trajectory. This additional spending offsets the policymaker’s earnings from interest 
and from the natural decay of CO2. The efficient tax on CO2 emissions must grow 
more slowly than exponentially.2
The presence of inertia in the climate system is valuable for a policy aiming to 
limit total warming. This value manifests itself in two ways. First, inertia allows the 
policymaker to delay emission reductions without immediately incurring the full 
temperature penalty. For any positive consumption discount rate, the temporary dis-
connect between CO2 and temperature provides a valuable degree of freedom which 
the policymaker uses to lower the present cost of policy.3 Second, inertia allows the 
policymaker to reduce the cumulative quantity of abatement undertaken over time. 
By delaying the temperature consequences of additional CO2, the climate system’s 
inertia allows more time for CO2 to decay. Even if future abatement costs are not 
1 For example, interactions with ocean heat sinks mean that the next decades’ warming will represent only about 
50 to 60 percent of the eventual equilibrium warming corresponding to their likely CO2 concentrations (Solomon 
et al. 2009). Even if we were to freeze all greenhouse gases at their current concentrations, the climate system’s 
inertia means that we could expect total warming to more than double from the current level (Wetherald, Stouffer, 
and Dixon 2001). 
2 Policymakers are increasingly discussing “geoengineering” approaches to controlling climate change. These 
approaches would directly control temperature rather than CO2, perhaps by shooting reflective particles into the 
atmosphere. In the online Appendix, we show that if a policymaker were willing to use this type of technology to 
achieve a temperature limit, then its efficient deployment would in fact follow a Hotelling trajectory, with the rate of 
increase modified by the degree of climatic inertia rather than by the rate at which CO2 decays. 
3 In particular, we show that the least-cost policy temporarily overshoots the steady-state CO2 level required 
by the temperature limit. Wigley (2003), Huntingford and Lowe (2007), and Wigley, Richels, and Edmonds 
(2007) previously suggested that overshoot trajectories might in fact be cheaper ways of achieving climate goals. 
Subsequent numerical experiments have supported this conjecture. 
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discounted, the policymaker reallocates abatement over time so as to reduce the 
cumulative quantity of abatement undertaken. In the presence of discounting or of 
natural decay of CO2, the climate system’s inertia allows for a lower initial tax and 
reduces the overall cost of the policy program.
Our results highlight a previously unrecognized flaw in estimates of the cost of 
limiting warming. The primary tools for estimating these costs are multisector mar-
ket equilibrium models, called “cost-effectiveness integrated assessment models.” 
Some economists criticize this modeling approach for not endogenizing savings or 
growth. Nonetheless, these models are the preferred tools for estimating the eco-
nomic implications of proposed policies because they implement detailed represen-
tations of energy systems, technologies, and climate dynamics. Other economists 
criticize this modeling approach for not optimizing the emission tax by trading off 
the welfare loss from climate change. Two arguments suggest that cost-effectiveness 
approaches can nonetheless provide valuable economic analysis. First, we know 
remarkably little about the harm from climate change. Such ignorance can justify 
analyzing predefined limits on temperature (Baumol 1972). Second, global climate 
agreements are clearly oriented around limiting warming to 2 degrees Celsius (°C). 
Economic analysis should guide the translation of this goal into policy.
We demonstrate a new first-order problem with cost-effectiveness models’ inter-
nal logic. These models’ detailed structures can prevent them from flexibly search-
ing for the policy trajectory that minimizes the cost of limiting warming. Instead, 
many of them assume that the cost-minimizing policy trajectory has the modified 
Hotelling form described above (Bauer et al. 2015). Contrary to common views 
(e.g., Tol 2013), we show that this policy path does not minimize the cost of limiting 
temperature to a chosen level. We show that using the incorrect policy trajectory can 
lead models to overestimate the cost of meeting a 2°C temperature target by a factor 
of 10–100. The errors from failing to endogenize savings or from failing to trade off 
the welfare loss from climate change are unlikely to be as large: in the benchmark 
cost-benefit integrated assessment model (Nordhaus 2008), the endogenous savings 
rate does not vary much across specifications and temperatures below 2°C reduce 
output by only 1 percent or less. By implementing policy paths that ignore inertia, 
computational equilibrium models’ results have overstated the minimum cost of 
achieving temperature limits, overestimated the level of the near-term emission tax 
consistent with these limits, and overvalued technologies that mature sooner rather 
than later.
I. Setting
A global planner seeks the least-cost emission path to limit global warming to an 
exogenous level  
_
 T . The setting is in continuous time, with an infinite-horizon plan-
ning period. Business-as-usual CO2 emissions  E > 0 arise exogenously. The pol-
icymaker chooses each instant’s quantity of abatement  A(t) , with the net emissions 
released to the atmosphere becoming  E − A(t) . The cost of abatement is  C(A(t)) , 
where C( · ) :  핉 + → 핉 is an increasing, twice-differentiable, continuous, and strictly 
convex function. For ease of exposition, we assume that  E and  C( · ) are stationary, 
and we ignore potential nonnegativity constraints on abatement and net emissions 
because they do not bind under the calibrations reported in the main text.
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Atmospheric carbon dioxide  M(t) is increased by net emissions. CO2 in excess of 
the preindustrial concentration  M pre decays at rate  δ ∈ (0, 1) :4
(1)  M ̇ (t) = E − A(t) − δ (M(t) −  M pre ) ,  
where dot notation indicates a time derivative. Atmospheric CO2 generates forc-
ing  F(M(t)) > 0 , with  F′(M(t)) > 0, F″(M(t)) < 0 . Forcing measures the green-
house effect, which traps outgoing heat. If maintained forever, one unit of forcing 
would generate  s > 0 units of warming, where  s is a transformation of the param-
eter commonly known as climate sensitivity. However, climatic inertia means that 
forcing does not immediately translate into temperature:
(2)  T ̇(t) = ϕ  [s F(M(t)) − T(t)] . 
The parameter  ϕ > 0 controls the degree of inertia in the system. Greater  ϕ indicates 
less inertia. As ϕ → ∞, there is no inertia: an instant’s forcing completely deter-
mines that instant’s temperature. As ϕ → 0, there is full inertia: temperature never 
changes, irrespective of forcing. This temperature representation follows Nordhaus 
(1991) and is a reduced version of the temperature module used in Nordhaus (2008).
The initial time  t 0 is given. The initial level of CO2 is  M 0 >  M pre , and initial tem-
perature is  T 0 <  
_
 T . Assume that  E > δ ( F −1 ( 
_
 T /s) −  M pre ) , so that maintaining 
temperature at  
_
 T requires strictly positive abatement. The policymaker selects an 
abatement trajectory in order to minimize the present cost of maintaining tempera-
ture below the policy target




  ∫  t 0  
∞
   e −r(t− t 0 ) C(A(t)) dt 
subject to 
equations (1) and (2),   T(t) ≤   
_
 T ,  M(  t 0 ) =  M 0 ,  T( t 0 ) =  T 0 .
The policymaker discounts costs at rate  r > 0 . We assume that damages from climate 
change are negligible for  T(t) ≤  
_
 T . This approach is consistent with international 
policy discussions and also with the technology-rich numerical models used to evalu-
ate policy. Including pre-threshold damages would not affect our theoretical insights.
Define  
_
 M as the unique CO2 concentration compatible with the climate system 
remaining at  
_
 T :  
_
 M ≜  F −1 ( 
_
 T /s) . The climate dynamics themselves directly imply 
two important results, proved in the online Appendix.
PROPOSITION 1:
 (i) Along a least-cost path, there exists a time  q such that  M ̇ (t) ≤ 0 for all times 
t ≥ q and  M ̇ (t) < 0 for some times  t ≥ q .
4 The online Appendix demonstrates that our primary analytic results are robust to the more complex carbon 
model of Golosov et al. (2014). The substantive differences resulting from that setting are that cumulative emissions 
are fixed by the temperature target and that the nonnegativity constraint on net emissions binds in our calibration. 
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 (ii) A path constrained by temperature limit  
_
 T can achieve strictly less cost than 
a path constrained by the corresponding CO2 limit  
_
 M .
The first result says that a least-cost CO2 trajectory overshoots the steady-state 
CO2 level consistent with the temperature constraint. This occurs because the iner-
tia in the climate system enables CO2 to temporarily exceed its steady-state level 
without violating the temperature constraint. Any path that does not take advan-
tage of this ability to overshoot the steady-state CO2 level cannot be a least-cost 
path. The proposition’s second result follows from the first: because a least-cost 
path must overshoot its steady-state CO2 level, indirectly achieving a temperature 
constraint by directly constraining CO2 must increase the cost of the efficient 
policy program.
II. Least-Cost Policy
The policymaker faces a control problem with a pure state constraint. See 
the online Appendix for background on such problems. When the state con-
straint binds, the choice of the control  A(t) is completely determined by the con-
straint. Following Hartl, Sethi, and Vickson (1995), write the state constraint as 
 h 0 (M(t), T(t), A(t)) =  
_
 T − T(t) ≥ 0 . Totally differentiating with respect to time, 
we have
  h 1 (M(t), T(t), A(t)) ≜   d h 
0 (M(t), T(t), A(t)) _________________
dt
 = − ϕ  [s F(M(t)) − T(t)] , 
  h 2 (M(t), T(t), A(t)) ≜   d h 
1 (M(t), T(t), A(t)) _________________
dt
 = − ϕ  [s F′(M(t))  M ̇ (t) −  T ̇(t)] . 
This state constraint is of order two because the control variable enters at the 
second derivative with respect to time (via  M ̇ (t) ). Form the current-value 
Hamiltonian:
 H(M(t), T(t), A(t),  λ M (t),  λ T (t)) = C(A(t)) +  λ M (t) [E − A(t) − δ (M(t) −  M pre ) ] 
 +  λ T (t) ϕ  [s F(M(t)) − T(t)] . 
The current-value Lagrangian is
 H[t] + ν(t) {− ϕs F′(M(t)) [E − A(t) − δ (M(t) −  M pre ) ] +  ϕ 2 [s F(M(t)) − T(t)] } , 
where we write  [t ] in place of the Hamiltonian’s full set of arguments. In addi-
tion to the transition equations, the initial conditions, and the state constraint, a 
least-cost trajectory must satisfy the following necessary conditions (Hartl, Sethi, 
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and Vickson 1995).5 First, it must satisfy the Maximum Principle and the adjoint 
equations:
(4)  C′(A(t)) =  λ M (t) − ν(t) ϕ s F′(M(t)), 
(5)  λ ̇M (t) = (r + δ)  λ M (t) − ϕ s F′(M(t))  λ T (t)
 + ν(t) ϕ s {F″(M(t)) M ̇ (t) − F′(M(t)) [δ + ϕ] } , 
(6)  λ ̇T (t) = (r + ϕ)  λ T (t) + ν(t)  ϕ 2 ,  
where primes indicate derivatives. Second, we have the analogue of the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions for the temperature constraint multiplier:
  ν(t)[ 
_
 T − T(t)] = 0,  ν(t) ≤ 0,   ν ̇(t) ≥ rν(t),   ν ̈(t) ≤ 2r v ̇(t) −  r 2 ν(t). 
Third, we have the jump conditions for the costate variables. Note that once the 
temperature constraint begins to bind, it must bind forever along a least-cost trajec-
tory. Let  τ denote the time at which the temperature constraint first binds, known 
as the entry time. The online Appendix shows that a least-cost trajectory cannot 
approach  
_
 T only asymptotically. Intuitively, a path that maintains  T(t) <  
_
 T at all 
times  t is more costly than one that allows slightly more emissions yet still remains 
weakly below  
_
 T . The least-cost path must therefore attain  
_
 T in finite time, which 
means that  τ is finite. The costate variables can jump at  τ :
(7)  λ M ( τ − ) =  λ M ( τ + ) −  e r(τ− t 0 )  η M 2 ϕsF′(M(τ)),
  λ T ( τ − ) =  λ T ( τ + ) −  e r(τ− t 0 )  η T 1 +  e r(τ− t 0 )  η T 2 ϕ,
 H[ τ − ] = H[ τ + ], 
where  η M 2 ,  η T 1 ,  η T 2 ≤ 0 and where superscript plus and minus indicate right and left 
limits, respectively. A final set of necessary conditions relates the jump variables  η 
to the constraint multiplier  ν(t) :
(8)  η T 1 ≤ − e −r(τ− t 0 )  ν ̇( τ + ) + r e −r(τ− t 0 ) ν( τ + ),   η M 2 =  η T 2 =  e −r(τ− t 0 ) ν( τ + ). 
Now consider least-cost policy once the constraint binds and just 
before the constraint binds. Because the constraint binds for all  t ≥ τ , we 
have  h 1 = 0 and  h 2 = 0 for all  t ≥ τ . The equality  h 1 = 0 implies that  M(t) =  
_
 M , 
and  h 2 = 0 implies that  A(t) = E − δ[ 
_
 M −  M pre ] ≜  A ̅. From equation (4), we have 
C′(A( τ − )) =  λ M ( τ − ) and  C′(A( τ + )) =  λ M ( τ + ) − ν( τ + )ϕ sF′(M(τ)) . Equation (7) 
and the necessary conditions in (8) then imply that abatement is continuous at 
5 Throughout, we focus on necessary conditions because the well-known scientific finding that  F″( · ) < 0 pre-
vents the application of standard sufficiency conditions. We adapt the necessary conditions from Hartl, Sethi, and 
Vickson (1995) to reflect the minimization objective and to express the multipliers in current-value terms. 
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 τ :  A( τ − ) = A( τ + ) . Therefore, as the system approaches time  τ , we know that 
T(t) →  
_
 T , M(t) →  
_
 M , and A(t) →  
_
 A .
In the remainder of this section, we study least-cost policy before the constraint 
binds. We have  ν(t) = 0 over these times  t ∈ [ t 0 , τ) . The least-cost abatement tra-
jectory sets the marginal cost of abatement equal to the shadow cost of CO2 as given 
by  λ M (t) in equation (4). This is a familiar condition. However, the dynamics of the 
shadow cost of CO2 are more interesting than commonly recognized.
First, note that all shadow costs are positive: another unit of temperature or CO2 
requires additional abatement, which raises the cost of the policy program. Using 
equation (6), the shadow cost of temperature obeys a familiar Hotelling-like condi-
tion, adjusted for the effects of climatic inertia:
(9)  λ T (t) =  λ T ( t 0 )  e (r+ϕ)(t− t 0 ) . 
Along an efficient path, the policymaker must be indifferent between accepting 
another unit of warming in any two instants. The benefit of delaying a unit of warm-
ing is composed of the time benefit  r  λ T (t) of delaying the cost by one more instant 
and also the inertial benefit  ϕ  λ T (t) of beginning the following instant with a lower 
temperature. If there is high inertia (with ϕ small), then temperature would not have 
changed much between the two instants and the inertial benefit is small. But if there 
is low inertia (with ϕ large), then temperature would have changed a lot and the 
inertial benefit is high. Along an efficient path, these benefits must balance the addi-
tional cost ( λ ̇T (t) ) imposed by delaying the temperature increase. Equating these 
benefits and costs yields the Hotelling-like condition.
The least-cost abatement policy is determined by the shadow cost of CO2. From 
the costate equation (5), the evolution of the least-cost abatement policy is controlled 
by two terms. The first, positive term is the standard decay-adjusted Hotelling con-
dition familiar from past literature. The second, negative term is novel. Using equa-
tions (5) and (9), the online Appendix shows that the marginal cost of abatement 
obeys the following relationship along the least-cost trajectory:
(10)  λ M ( t 0 ) =  e −[r+δ](t− t 0 )  λ M (t) +  e −[r+δ](t− t 0 )  λ T (t)  ∫  t 0  
t
 e −(ϕ−δ)(t−i) ϕ sF′(M(i)) di,  
recalling that  C′(A(t)) =  λ M (t) . The left-hand side is the present cost of abating an 
additional unit of CO2 at time  t 0 . The right-hand side is the present benefit of abating 
an additional unit of CO2 at time  t 0 . The first term is the modified Hotelling term 
motivated in the introduction and familiar from previous literature. It recognizes 
that the policymaker should spend fewer dollars early because she discounts future 
spending and because additional CO2 emissions have more chance to decay when 
emitted at an earlier time. If the target were expressed in units of CO2 rather than 
temperature, then this would be the only term, and the shadow cost of CO2 would 
grow at rate  r + δ .6
6 This modified Hotelling term is also the only term in the absence of inertia. As ϕ → ∞, the integral on the 
right-hand side of equation (10) vanishes ( lim ϕ→∞ e −ϕ(t−i) ϕ = 0), and because temperature imposes no direct cost 
without inertia,  λ T (t) also vanishes. 
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But the target is expressed in units of temperature, not CO2. The second com-
ponent of the present benefit of additional time  t 0 abatement describes how it alters 
time  t temperature by changing temperature (via forcing) between times  t 0 and  t . The 
total reduction in time  t temperature from an additional unit of time  t 0 abatement is7
 χ(t)  ≜  − dT(t) ______
dA( t 0 )
  =  − ∫  t 0  
t
 d T 
̇(i) ______
dA( t 0 )
  di  =   ∫  t 0  
t
 [ e 
−δ(i− t 0 ) ϕsF′(M(i))  +  ϕ ∫  t 0  
i
 d T 
̇( j) ______
dA( t 0 )
  dj] di
  −χ(i) 
               
 
 =  e −δ(t− t 0 )  ∫  t 0  
t
 e −(ϕ−δ)(t−i) ϕsF′(M(i)) di > 0.
The integral describes how additional time  t 0 abatement changes time  i forcing and 
how a change in time  i forcing changes time  t temperature. The present value of the 
effect of additional time  t 0 abatement on time  t temperature is  e −r(t− t 0 )  λ T (t) χ(t) , 
which is the second term on the right-hand side of equation (10).
The online Appendix develops a phase portrait analysis of the system, establishes 
further results about the least-cost trajectory, derives least-cost policy under the car-
bon model of Golosov et al. (2014), and shows that the least-cost trajectory for a 
geoengineering policy has a modified Hotelling form.
III. Calibrated Numerical Example
We now use a calibrated numerical example to estimate the gains from using the 
least-cost policy program. The online Appendix gives details and assesses sensitiv-
ity to assumptions like constant emissions and geometric decay.
Figure 1 shows how the least-cost path (solid line) differs from the standard 
Hotelling solution (dashed line), which is the least-cost policy for constraining CO2 
to levels below  
_
 M . The climate system’s inertia enables the least-cost policy to post-
pone abatement to later dates without overshooting  
_
 T . The Hotelling policy abates 
emissions too aggressively because it fails to take advantage of the climate system’s 
inertia (panel A). Its resulting temperature trajectory is therefore lower than required 
by the temperature limit (panel B), and the system’s inertia in fact prevents tem-
perature from ever reaching  
_
 T in finite time under the Hotelling policy. Whereas 
the least-cost policy overshoots  
_
 M by nearly 100 ppm (panel C), the Hotelling tra-
jectory never takes advantage of the breathing space afforded by the slowness with 
which the climate system reacts to overshooting  
_
 M . As a consequence, the carbon 
price starts out much higher under the Hotelling policy and also rises faster until 
abatement nears its steady-state level (panel D). However, after the year 2100, the 
least-cost policy does end up raising the carbon price to levels beyond any reached 
under the Hotelling trajectory. As CO2 overshoots its steady-state level, the least-cost 
policy begins undertaking aggressive abatement so as to reduce CO2 before tem-
perature exceeds  
_
 T . Consistent with the theoretical analysis in the online Appendix, 
7 The top line uses equation (2) and recognizes that  dM(t)/dA( t 0 ) = − e −δ(t− t 0 ) . The bottom line follows from 
converting the top line into a differential equation for  χ(t) and recognizing that  dT( t 0 )/dA( t 0 ) = 0 .
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the efficient carbon price peaks only after CO2 has peaked, and the carbon price then 
declines swiftly toward its steady-state value.8
Panel D of Figure 1 also plots the Hotelling component (dotted line) of the least-
cost carbon price path, as given by the first term in equation (10). Recognizing 
inertia’s braking services makes the least-cost trajectory differ from the Hotelling 
trajectory in two ways. First, recognizing inertia tends to bend the least-cost trajec-
tory away from its Hotelling component. The gap between the Hotelling component 
and the least-cost path represents the trajectory adjustment for inertia, which we 
have seen slows the carbon price’s rate of increase. Second, recognizing inertia also 
reduces the initial carbon price in order to delay abatement. This downward shift in 
the starting value flattens the Hotelling component of the least-cost trajectory rela-
tive to the full Hotelling path (compare the dotted and dashed lines). Near the initial 
time, the least-cost path differs from the Hotelling path primarily via the downward 
8 The qualitative properties of our theoretical setting (i.e., CO2 overshooting its steady-state level and non-
monotonic trajectories for emissions and the carbon price) also appear in temperature-constrained simulations of 
the benchmark DICE integrated assessment model (Nordhaus 2008, ch. 5). Thus, our primary results are robust 
to including features such as nonstationary business-as-usual emissions, improving abatement technology, savings 
decisions, pre-threshold damages from temperature change, and more complex carbon and temperature models. 
Figure 1
Notes: The least-cost trajectories (solid lines) for emissions, temperature, CO2, and the carbon price for a tempera-
ture limit of  
_
 T = 2°C. Also, conventional Hotelling-like paths (dashed lines), which are also the least-cost paths 
for the corresponding CO2 constraint.
Panel A. Emissions net of abatement Panel B. Temperature
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shift in the initial carbon price. The trajectory adjustment becomes more significant 
over time, beginning to strongly slow the carbon price’s rate of increase near the 
end of this century, or around the same time that the least-cost CO2 trajectory peaks.
Table 1 describes how the present cost of the policy program, the year 2005 car-
bon price, the peak carbon price, and cumulative abatement over the next 200 years 
vary with the temperature limit  
_
 T and with the recognition of climatic inertia. By 
ignoring the climate system’s inertia, the Hotelling path adds over $2 trillion in 
unnecessary costs for a limit of 2°C. Recognizing inertia allows the policymaker 
to save money both by postponing abatement and by undertaking less cumulative 
abatement. The climate system’s inertia allows for greater natural decay of CO2 
because it delays the temperature consequences of CO2 emissions (granting more 
time for decay) and because it allows the CO2 concentration to overshoot its steady-
state level (decay is proportional to the quantity of CO2). The ability to postpone 
emission reductions and to undertake fewer emission reductions in total lowers the 
initial carbon price by over 90 percent, although the need to bring CO2 back down to 
its steady-state level increases the peak carbon price by around 200 percent.9
IV. Discussion
We have shown that the least-cost approach to a temperature limit prices carbon 
emissions at a rate that increases more slowly than exponentially. It also temporarily 
overshoots the steady-state CO2 level. Computational equilibrium models are the 
primary tool for estimating the cost of proposed climate policies. These models 
often assume that the emission price follows an exponential (Hotelling) price path 
(e.g., Thomson et al. 2011; Bauer et al. 2015) and/or represent a temperature con-
straint via a constraint on forcing or CO2 (e.g., Edenhofer et al. 2010). By failing 
to take advantage of the climate system’s inertia, these modeled policies under-
take more total abatement than necessary and ramp up policy faster than necessary. 
Furthermore, these technology-rich integrated assessment models are used to learn 
about the relative values of prospective low-carbon technologies, but this relative 
value likely depends on whether the carbon price follows a Hotelling path or instead 
9 For the carbon model of Golosov et al. (2014), the online Appendix shows that recognizing inertia reduces 
spending on a 2°C temperature limit by nearly $13 trillion, reduces the initial carbon price by 70 percent, and 
increases the peak carbon price by 16 percent. 
Table 1—The Present Cost of Each Policy Program, the Initial Carbon Prices, the Peak Carbon 
Prices, and Cumulative Abatement over the Next 200 Years
Temperature limit (°C)
2 2.5 3
Cost of efficient path from 2005 to 2205 ($billions) 98 1.5 0.0001
Cost of Hotelling path from 2005 to 2205 ($billions) 2,466 181 1.4
CO2 price along the efficient path in 2005 ($/tCO2) 0.18 0.003 0.000003
CO2 price along the Hotelling path in 2005 ($/tCO2) 5.8 0.39 0.003
Peak CO2 price along the efficient path ($/tCO2) 291 164 49
Peak CO2 price along the Hotelling path ($/tCO2) 107 54 15
Abatement from 2005 to 2205 along the efficient path (Gt C) 708 266 8
Abatement from 2005 to 2205 along the Hotelling path (Gt C) 917 540 178
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follows the inverse-U-shaped trajectory described in the present paper. Given that 
international policy discussions are focused on temperature limits, it should be 
a high priority to reassess these models’ conclusions using frameworks that take 
advantage of the braking services provided by the climate system’s inertia.
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